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Abstract
When we observe a motor act (e.g. grasping a cup) done by another individual, we extract, according to how the motor act
is performed and its context, two types of information: the goal (grasping) and the intention underlying it (e.g. grasping for
drinking). Here we examined whether children with autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) are able to understand these two
aspects of motor acts. Two experiments were carried out. In the first, one group of high-functioning children with ASD and
one of typically developing (TD) children were presented with pictures showing hand-object interactions and asked what
the individual was doing and why. In half of the ‘‘why’’ trials the observed grip was congruent with the function of the
object (‘‘why-use’’ trials), in the other half it corresponded to the grip typically used to move that object (‘‘why-place’’ trials).
The results showed that children with ASD have no difficulties in reporting the goals of individual motor acts. In contrast
they made several errors in the why task with all errors occurring in the ‘‘why-place’’ trials. In the second experiment the
same two groups of children saw pictures showing a hand-grip congruent with the object use, but within a context
suggesting either the use of the object or its placement into a container. Here children with ASD performed as TD children,
correctly indicating the agent’s intention. In conclusion, our data show that understanding others’ intentions can occur in
two ways: by relying on motor information derived from the hand-object interaction, and by using functional information
derived from the object’s standard use. Children with ASD have no deficit in the second type of understanding, while they
have difficulties in understanding others’ intentions when they have to rely exclusively on motor cues.
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Introduction
Autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) is a heterogeneous syndrome
characterized by impairment in social skills, verbal and nonverbal
communication, and restricted and repetitive behaviors [1].
Deficits in the domains of affective links and emotional behavior
are other aspects of ASD [2–4].
Autism affects a variety of nervous structures ranging from the
brainstem to the cerebellum and the cerebral cortex [5–11]. As far
as the cerebral cortex is concerned, evidence has been recently
provided for a marked disorder of its connectivity involving
primarily, although not exclusively, intrahemispheric connections
[see 12–16]. Beside white matter, alterations of gray matter and its
intrinsic connectivity have also been reported [17–20]. Among
studies reporting gray matter alterations, of particular interest is
the study showing a correlation between the thinning of fronto-
parietal areas and the severity of autistic impairment [20].
Alterations of cortical connectivity and, in particular, of associa-
tion areas have been proposed to represent one of the major
causes, or possibly the major cause, of the cognitive deficits
characterizing ASD [16,21].
These cortical abnormalities appear to affect the functioning of
mirror mechanism [20], a neural mechanism that plays an
important role in social cognition [22–26]. Evidence for mirror
mechanism impairment in ASD comes from EEG [27–32], MEG
[33], TMS [34] and fMRI studies [35]. Among them, particularly
influential in establishing a link between mirror mechanism
impairment and autistic disorders has been an fMRI study by
Dapretto et al [35]. These authors scanned high functioning
children with ASD and matched controls during imitation and
observation of emotional expressions. The results showed a
significantly weaker activation in the inferior frontal gyrus in
children with ASD with respect to TD children. Most interest-
ingly, the activation was inversely related to symptom severity.
While instrumental data indicate a deficit in the mirror
mechanism in autism, behavioral findings appear to challenge
this link [36–39]. In particular, a recent study that specifically
tested the ‘‘mirror mechanism hypothesis’’ of ASD found that
children with ASD recognize the goal of others’ motor acts, a
function that, according to the standard interpretation of the
mirror mechanism, has to be impaired in the case of mirror
mechanism malfunctioning [36].
To get an insight into the possible reasons for this discrepancy
between behavioral and instrumental data, it is important to make
clear that the term ‘‘action understanding’’ conceals two different
meanings. An example will clarify this point: John observes Mary
who is grasping a cup of coffee. John immediately understands two
things: a) the what of Mary’s motor act (she is grasping the cup) and b)
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the why of Mary’s motor act (e.g. she is grasping the cup to drink
coffee). These two aspects of action understanding, although
frequently confused, are actually radically different one from the
other. The first provides an immediate perceptual datum derived by
motor act observation; the second is an anticipation of a future behavior
based on an ‘‘intention-reading’’ mechanism. There is evidence that
the mirror mechanism is involved in both these aspects of action
understanding [40], but the way in which it is involved is different in
the case of the what and the why of a motor act.
The what of a motor act (e.g. grasping) derives from the
activation of mirror neurons which determines in the cortical
motor system of the observer a motor representation matching the
observed motor act. This motor representation allows the observer
to know what the other is doing.
This mechanism, however, does not appear to be sufficient to
allow one to understand the why of an observed motor act. The
why requires a more complex mechanism, which, although
centered on mirror neurons, also involves other motor neurons.
It has been recently shown that in the inferior parietal lobule (IPL)
there is a set of neurons (‘action-constrained motor neurons’) that
fire only when a motor act (e.g. grasping) is part of a given action
(e.g. grasping for eating) [41]. These neurons are organized into
chains, where each neuron codes a certain motor act (e.g.
reaching, grasping, etc.). When an individual intends to perform a
given action (e.g. to reach a piece of food to eat it) an entire chain
is activated, leading to the fulfillment of his/her intention. Most
interestingly, many action-constrained motor neurons also fire
during action observation. This activation, induced by the
observed motor act, triggers the same action chain that the
observers endogenously activate to achieve their intention. This
mechanism enables the observer to understand directly the motor
intention of others without inferential processing.
The distinction between single neuron- and action chain-based
mirror mechanisms might provide a solution to the present
contradiction between the neurophysiological data showing a
deficit of the mirror mechanism in autism and the behavioral data
indicating that the understanding of the goal of a motor act is
intact in ASD. A possibility is that the basic single neuron mirror
mechanism is essentially intact in ASD, but the chained
organization is impaired.
Cattaneo et al. [42] provided evidence that chaining is impaired
in ASD. They studied a group of TD children and a group of
children with ASD while they observed an experimenter grasping
an object with two different purposes, to eat or to place it into a
container. The EMG activity of the mylohyoid muscle (MH), a
muscle involved in mouth opening, was recorded. The results
showed that in TD children, the observation of grasping leading to
eating determined an activation of the MH muscle, while such
activation was not present in children with ASD. In a second
experiment both ASD and TD children were asked to perform the
same actions. In TD children activation of the MH muscle started
as soon as they began the reaching movement, much before the
object was grasped. In contrast, no MH muscle activation was
observed during reaching and grasping in children with ASD. MH
muscle activation appeared only late, when children started
bringing food to the mouth.
These data indicate, on the one side, that children with ASD are
impaired in assembling their individual motor acts (reaching,
grasping, placing) into a unitary action characterized by a specific
intention (e.g. grasping-for-eating), on the other that their mirror
chains are weakened, as shown by the lack of MH muscle
activation (recorded in TD children) during action observation.
Given these findings, the question arises of whether the
behavioral data that suggest an intact mirror mechanism in
ASD children derives from the fact that, in those studies, only the
what aspect of action understanding was tested or whether indeed
children with ASD have no deficits in both aspects (the what and
the why) of action understanding. To answer this question we
carried out two behavioral studies in which TD and ASD children
were asked to watch hand-object interactions and to identify the
observed motor acts as well the motor intention underlying them.
The results showed that children with ASD are able to understand
the what of a motor act, but are impaired in understanding the why
of it when they have to rely exclusively on the agent’s motor
behavior.
Methods
This study consists of two experiments. They were carried out
on a group of children with ASD (15 males and 1 female, mean
age: 9.7462.22) and a group of typically developing (TD) children
(21 males and 4 females, mean age: 8.3460.57). The experiments
were approved by the local ethical committee and were conducted
according to the Helsinki declaration. The parents of the
participants gave informed written consent.
Children with ASD were recruited at the Center for Pediatric
Neuropsychiatry in Empoli (ASL 11) and at the Center for Autism
in Reggio Emilia. The diagnosis was made by a licensed clinical
psychologist or a medical doctor not associated with this research.
Module 3 of the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS)
was used to confirm the diagnosis of autistic disorder or autism
spectrum disorder [43]. Scores from 7 to 10 (Module 3) indicate
autistic spectrum disorder and scores from 10 and above indicate
autism. The mean ADOS total score was of 14.5 (SD 3.77). Based
on the results of this scale and clinical judgment, 14 of the 16
children met criteria for autistic disorder, and the remaining 2 met
criteria for autism spectrum disorder. All the patients had an
intelligence quotient (IQ)$70, calculated with the Wechsler
Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised (WISC-R) [44] with mean
IQ 88.18 (SD 12.28). Table 1 shows age, IQ, and ADOS values
for all children of the ADS group.
The control group was matched to the ASD group for verbal
age, evaluated by Peabody Picture Vocabulary test (PPVT-R) [45]
and for non-verbal cognitive level, tested by Raven’s Progressive
Matrices [26]. The mean score of Raven’s Progressive Matrices
did not differ significantly (p = 0.49) between the two groups. The
mean values were 78.00 (SD 20.16) for the ASD group and 88.12
(SD 15.56) for the TD group. Mean verbal ages as assessed by the
Peabody Picture Vocabulary test (PPVT) were also not signifi-
cantly different (p = 0.55) in the two groups. Mean values were
11.11 years (SD 4.40) for the ASD group and 11.95 years (SD
3.41) for the TD.
Table 1. Demographics for children participating in the
study.
ASD Group (N=16) TD Group (N=25)
(Mean/SD) (Mean/SD)
Chronological Age 9.74 (+/22.22) 8.34 (+/20.57)
IQ 88.18 (+/212.28) NA
Non Verbal Cognitive Level 78.00 (+/220.16) 88.12 (+/215.56)
Verbal Age 11.11 (+/24.40) 11.95 (+/23.41)
ADOS 14.5 (+/23.77) NA
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005596.t001
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Experiments 1
Children saw two pictures presented one after the other on a
computer screen (Figure 1, top). The first picture showed an object
on a neutral background. Participants were asked to name it and
their response was recorded. A second picture was then presented,
showing the same object plus a hand making contact with it. The
transition between the two pictures was done manually. The
second picture showed one of the following three types of hand-
object interactions: a) a hand touching an object (‘‘touch’’
pictures); b) a hand grasping an object with a grip commonly
employed for moving and placing it to another location (‘‘place’’
pictures); c) a hand grasping an object with the grip typically
employed for using that object (‘‘use’’ pictures). The total set of
stimuli for each child comprised 17 objects 63 hand-object
interaction pictures for a total of 51 stimulus pairs. They were
presented in a pseudo-random order.
A brief training session of 7 stimulus pairs preceded the
experiment. During training, when viewing the second picture the
child was asked: ‘‘What is she doing? Touching or grasping?’’ When
the picture showed a grip and the child correctly answered
‘‘grasping’’, the experimenter further asked: ‘‘Why is she grasping
the object? To place it or to use it?’’ During the experimental session
Figure 1. Experimental design of the two experiments. Examples of stimuli employed and the relative questions are shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005596.g001
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the questions asked to the children did not include the forced
choice provided in the training, instead they were asked: ‘‘What is
she doing?’’ (‘‘what’’ task) and ‘‘Why is she grasping the object?’’ (‘‘why’’
task). Therefore the ‘‘what’’ task occurred over the 51 trials, while
the ‘‘why’’ task over 34 trials. The children were allowed to take as
much time as they wanted to answer. All trials were videotaped.
Responses were categorized as correct or incorrect. Responses
to the first question were considered correct if the answer was
‘‘touching’’ or ‘‘grasping’’ in response to the appropriate picture.
Answers to the second question were considered correct if children
reported the intention typically related to the use of the object (e.g.
‘‘to brush’’ for a brush, ‘‘to phone’’ for a telephone) in response to
‘‘use’’ pictures, or answered ‘‘placing’’ in response to ‘‘place’’
pictures. Separate error rates were calculated for ‘‘why-use’’ (17
trials) and ‘‘why-place’’ (17 trials) responses.
Experiment 2
As in Experiment 1 children saw two pictures presented one
after the other on a computer screen. The first picture showed an
object on a neutral background. Participants were asked to name it
and their response was recorded. A second picture showed a hand
grasping an object. The grip was always a use grip. Near the hand,
there was another object (or group of objects) that suggested either:
(a) an intention of placing the object (‘‘why-place’’ task; e.g. a pair
of scissors grasped near a container) or (b) the intention of using it
(‘‘why-use’’ task; e.g. a pair of scissors grasped near a sheet of
paper) (Figure 1, bottom). The total set of stimuli for each child
comprised 17 objects 62 context pictures for a total of 34
presentations. The stimulus pairs were presented in a pseudo-
random order.
A brief training session made up of 7 stimulus pairs preceded the
experiment. The experimental procedure was the same as in
Experiment 1. Responses were rated as correct if the answer to the
question matched the agent’s intentions as suggested by the
context. Otherwise they were labeled as incorrect. Separate error
rates were calculated for each subject for ‘‘why-use’’ trials (17
trials) and for ‘‘why-place’’ trials (17 trials).
Statistical Analysis
Comparisons between the demographical data and clinical test
scores of the two groups were performed with t-tests. The main
analysis was conducted with ANOVAs on error rates as dependent
variable. In Experiment 1 a mixed ANOVA with two factors was
carried out: between-subjects factor, Group, (2 levels: TD and
Figure 2. Results of Experiment 1. Error rates are plotted as
percentage for each task. *** indicates significant difference
(p = 0.0001). Error bars represent 95% CI.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005596.g002
Table 2. Individual error rates expressed as percentages for
all participants in the Experiment 1.
n. Group IQ What Why-place Why-use
1 ASD 102 15.7 32.4 2.9
2 ASD 75 2.0 41.2 0.0
3 ASD 94 15.7 26.5 0.0
4 ASD 102 0.0 41.2 0.0
5 ASD 87 11.8 5.9 0.0
6 ASD 77 5.9 8.8 5.9
7 ASD 91 7.8 23.5 0.0
8 ASD 78 7.8 23.5 5.9
9 ASD 75 0.0 11.8 5.9
10 ASD 87 2.0 14.7 2.9
11 ASD 90 15.7 29.4 0.0
12 ASD 70 5.9 29.4 2.9
13 ASD 72 2.0 38.2 2.9
14 ASD 89 0.0 47.1 0.0
15 ASD 91 11.8 14.7 14.7
16 ASD 110 0.0 11.8 11.8
1 TD - 0.0 8.8 0.0
2 TD - 11.8 5.9 0.0
3 TD - 13.7 2.9 2.9
4 TD - 0.0 5.9 0.0
5 TD - 3.9 5.9 0.0
6 TD - 5.9 14.7 0.0
7 TD - 2.0 8.8 2.9
8 TD - 2.0 23.5 8.8
9 TD - 2.0 8.8 0.0
10 TD - 0.0 11.8 2.9
11 TD - 9.8 8.8 0.0
12 TD - 2.0 0.0 0.0
13 TD - 3.9 5.9 0.0
14 TD - 0.0 11.8 11.8
15 TD - 0.0 8.8 2.9
16 TD - 2.0 8.8 17.6
17 TD - 2.0 14.7 5.9
18 TD - 3.9 20.6 14.7
19 TD - 11.8 8.8 11.8
20 TD - 2.0 2.9 14.7
21 TD - 5.9 8.8 5.9
22 TD - 13.7 14.7 5.9
23 TD - 2.0 14.7 11.8
24 TD - 3.9 2.9 0.0
25 TD - 2.0 11.8 2.9
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005596.t002
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ASD group), within-subjects factor, Task type, (3 levels: ‘‘what’’
task, ‘‘why-use’’ task and ‘‘why-place’’ task).
In Experiment 2 a mixed ANOVA with two factors was
performed employing a between-subjects factor, Group, (2 levels:
TD and ASD group) and a within-subjects factor, Task type (2
levels: ‘‘why-use’’ and ‘‘why-place’’).
Post-hoc analysis in both experiments was carried out using
multiple t-tests with Bonferroni correction. Confidence intervals
for differences between means have also been assessed.
Results
Experiment 1
The percentage error for TD and ASD children in ‘‘what’’,
‘‘why-use’’ and ‘‘why-place’’ trials are shown in Fig. 2. The
number of errors in the first two types of trials (‘‘what’’ and ‘‘why-
use’’) is similar across both groups. In contrast, the number of
errors in ‘‘why place’’ trials is markedly higher in ASD group.
Table 2 shows the individual error rates, expressed as percentages,
for every participant and their IQ.
The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of Group (F(1,
39) = 23.1, p,0.0001), with ASD children making more errors
than TD children, and Task type (F(2, 78) = 41.7, p,0.0001) with
more errors in the ‘‘why-place’’ trials. A significant interaction was
also found between the Group and the Task type factors
(F(2,78) = 15.4, p,0.0001). The relevant post-hoc comparisons
and the confidence intervals for the differences between means
(Table 3) showed a marked increase in error rates in ASD children
compared to TD children in the ‘‘why-place’’ task, in spite of no
difference between the two groups in the error rates for the ‘‘what’’
and ‘‘why-use’’ tasks.
Experiment 2
The percentage of errors made by TD and ASD children in the
two types of trials of this experiment are shown in Fig 3. The
number of errors in both types of trials (‘‘why-use’’ and ‘‘why-
place’’) was similar in the two groups. Table 4 shows the individual
error rates, expressed as percentages, for every participant.
The ANOVA did not show any significant effect of the Group
(F (1, 39) = 0.74268, p= 0.39407) or Task (F (1, 39) = 0.25298,
p = 0.61781) factors, nor did it show any interaction between the
two factors (F (1, 39) = 1.3175, p = 0.25804). Post-hoc comparisons
and the confidence intervals for the differences between means
confirmed the absence of differences in the performance of the two
groups in both tasks (Table 5).
Discussion
Before proceeding to discuss the data of the present study, let us
come back to the example given in the introduction: Mary and her
cup of coffee. The deceptively simple action of drinking coffee is
not unitary, but comprises a series of discrete steps: reaching for
the cup, grasping it, holding it, and bringing the cup to the mouth.
These action elements are referred to as motor acts [47]. Each
motor act has its own goal, that of organizing the movements in
such a way that the effectors may interact with the objects in an
efficient way. Mary’s intention selects motor acts and unifies them
into a motor action. Her intention is fulfilled when she achieves the
final goal of the action and obtains reinforcement.
Now, when witnessing the motor act performed by Mary (e.g.
grasping a cup), John recognizes what she is doing, that is the goal
of that motor act. In addition, according to how this motor act is
performed, coupled with the context in which it is performed, he
also understands why she is doing it, i.e. Mary’s motor intention.
As far as the understanding of what is concerned, Experiment 1
showed that children with ASD have no difficulties in reporting
the goal of observed motor acts. They were able to understand the
hand-object interactions without any significant difference with
respect to TD children. A different and more complex pattern was
found for the understanding of why. Unlike TD children, children
with ASD exhibited a significant deficit in understanding the
intention underlying the observed motor act. This deficit was
present, however, only in the ‘‘why-place’’ task, but not in the
‘‘why-use’’ task.
How can this discrepancy be accounted for? An explanation
may be found by considering the two different types of information
on the agent’s intention, that the observation of a hand grasping
an object provides to an observer: a) motor information, based on
the observed hand-object interaction and b) functional information,
Table 3. Post-hoc comparisons in Experiment 1 between the error rates of the two groups in each of the 3 tasks.
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) t-value DF p-value 295% +95%
ASD (n= 16) TD (n = 25)
What task 6.50 (6.0) 4.23 (4.4) 1.386758 39 0.173392 22.6576 7.177203
Why-use task 3.49 (4.5) 4.94 (5.7) 20.863138 39 0.393339 23.10933 6.006384
Why-place task 25.0 (12.8) 9.65 (5.5) 5.300345 39 0.000005 6.342845 24.36304
Correction for the number of comparisons gives a significance level of 0.016. In the last 2 columns confidence intervals for mean differences are shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005596.t003
Figure 3. Results of Experiment 2. Error rates are plotted as
percentage for each task.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005596.g003
Autism and Intention
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 May 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 5 | e5596
based on the object’s typical use. In the ‘‘why-use’’ task the motor
information was congruent with the functional one; therefore, both
the handgrip and the object function suggested the same intention.
By contrast, in the ‘‘why-place’’ task such congruence was lacking,
and intention understanding must rely exclusively on the hand-
object motor interaction. The increased error rates for children
with ASD, with respect to TD children, in the ‘‘why-place’’ trials
indicate, therefore, that, unlike TD children, children with ASD
did not fully succeed in processing the motor information coming
from the agent’s hand shape, and based their judgment concerning
the agent’s intention mainly on the object’s functional information.
Thus, the sight of a cup triggered the response ‘‘for drinking’’,
while the sight of a pair scissors the response ‘‘for cutting’’, even
when the observed handgrip rendered these actions very
implausible.
The results of Experiment 2 corroborated this interpretation. In
this experiment, the handgrip was congruent with object use in both
the ‘‘why-use’’ and ‘‘why-place’’ trials, but other objects with
specific functions provided additional information on the agent’s
intention (e.g. scissors near a piece of paper = cutting; scissors near
a box= putting the scissors into the box). The rational of the
experiment was the following: if children with ASD fail in
intention understanding when they have to rely on motor
information, the substitution of motor cues (i.e. different kinds of
hand-grip) with functional cues (i.e. additional objects having
different functions located close to the object the hand interacts
with) should allow children with ASD to markedly improve their
performance in the ‘‘why-place’’ task, bringing it to the level
reported in the ‘‘why-use’’ task. This was exactly what was found.
In Experiment 2 children with ASD performed both the ‘‘why’’
tasks with very low error rates, recognizing the agent’s intention in
the same way as TD children.
Experiment 2 also shows that the errors of children with ASD in
the ‘‘why-place’’ trials in Experiment 1 were not due to
stereotyped responses triggered by the objects, or to some
intellectual deficit, but to their incapacity to use motor information
to understand the intention of others. When they had additional
information from objects surrounding the object acted upon in
‘‘why-place’’ trials, they were able to perform the task and read
correctly the agent’s intention to place the object rather than using
it.
Taken together, these findings allow one to offer an explanation
for the apparent contradiction between, on the one side,
electrophysiological and brain imaging data suggesting that a
deficit in the mirror mechanism could be the basis for autistic
impairment in action understanding [27–35] and, on the other,
behavioral studies indicating that children with ASD do not
present deficits in understanding observed motor acts [36–39].
The ‘‘what’’ task in our Experiment 1 showed that children with
ASD are able to recognize individual motor acts with the same
error rates as TD children. This does not imply, however, that the
‘‘mirror mechanism hypothesis’’ of ASD is wrong. As mentioned
in Introduction, neurophysiological data indicate a clear distinc-
tion between single neuron-based mirror mechanism and chain-
based mirror mechanism in action understanding. The first
mechanism plays a fundamental role in understanding what
individuals are doing, the other why they are doing it, i.e. their
motor intention. Although, we cannot exclude the possibility that
the single-neuron mirror mechanism is hypofunctioning in
children with ASD (bearing in mind the extreme simplicity of
our tasks) yet the main deficit appears to depends on a deficit in
the chain-based mirror mechanism.
Consistent with this interpretation are the data from the study of
Cattaneo et al. [42]. This study showed that, unlike TD children,
children with ASD show a deficit in translating their intentions
into motor actions as well as in activating, during the observation
of others’ actions, their own corresponding motor chains. These
findings clearly indicate that the chained organization of motor
acts is impaired in children in ASD. They also show that children
with ASD do not execute motor tasks using intention-based
anticipatory behavior, as TD children do, but their action
Table 4. Individual error rates expressed as percentages for
all participants in the Experiment 2.
n. Group IQ Why-place Why-use
1 ASD 102 11.8 11.8
2 ASD 75 0.0 0.0
3 ASD 94 0.0 5.9
4 ASD 102 0.0 0.0
5 ASD 87 11.8 0.0
6 ASD 77 0.0 0.0
7 ASD 91 0.0 0.0
8 ASD 78 0.0 5.9
9 ASD 75 0.0 0.0
10 ASD 87 5.9 5.9
11 ASD 90 11.8 0.0
12 ASD 70 5.9 5.9
13 ASD 72 5.9 0.0
14 ASD 89 0.0 5.9
15 ASD 91 0.0 0.0
16 ASD 110 0.0 0.0
1 TD - 0.0 29.4
2 TD - 5.9 5.9
3 TD - 11.8 11.8
4 TD - 5.9 5.9
5 TD - 0.0 0.0
6 TD - 0.0 0.0
7 TD - 0.0 0.0
8 TD - 0.0 0.0
9 TD - 11.8 11.8
10 TD - 17.6 29.4
11 TD - 0.0 0.0
12 TD - 0.0 0.0
13 TD - 5.9 23.5
14 TD - 0.0 0.0
15 TD - 17.6 0.0
16 TD - 0.0 0.0
17 TD - 5.9 5.9
18 TD - 0.0 0.0
19 TD - 0.0 0.0
20 TD - 0.0 0.0
21 TD - 0.0 5.9
22 TD - 0.0 0.0
23 TD - 0.0 0.0
24 TD - 0.0 0.0
25 TD - 5.3 5.3
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005596.t004
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organization relies step-by-step on functional characteristics of the
objects they act upon. This behavior parallels the tendency shown
by children with ASD in the present experiment to interpret the
behavior of others on the basis of the functional information given
by objects, rather than on the intentional information present in
their motor acts.
Interpretation of the ‘‘mirror hypothesis’’ of ASD in terms of a
deficit of the chain-based mirror mechanism [42], rather than in
terms of hypo-function of mirror neurons [see 22,25,27–35] is in
accord with growing evidence of alterations in intra-hemispheric
connectivity in ASD [see Introduction] and the proposal that these
alterations represent a major cause of the cognitive deficits in ASD
[16,21]. Although intra-hemispheric alterations may cause a
deficit in the development of individual mirror neurons due, for
example, to weakened connections between the superior temporal
sulcus areas (where neurons with complex visual properties are
located, see [48]), and the inferior parietal lobule (a core center of
the mirror system for non-emotional actions, see [24], these
alterations ought to produce more destructive effects on the
chained organization of the mirror system, which implies a
complex network, than on individual mirror neurons. Further-
more, the hypothesis of a deficit of mirror neurons per se has
difficulties in accounting for impairment in the organization of
actions during their execution in ASD children [42], while by
contrast this impairment fits well with the notion of diffuse
connectivity alterations.
The demonstration of a deficit in intention understanding based
on motor information does not imply of course that children with
ASD are unable to grasp the intentions of others at all. The
capacity to understand others’ intentions can be also mediated by
other mechanisms. It could derive from the functional use of the
objects the agent interacts with (see Experiment 1), from the
objects surrounding those objects (Experiment 2), and possibly, in
some circumstances, as in TD individuals, from inferential
mechanisms [49–51]. Guessing others’ intentions, however, on
the basis of the functional use of objects provides only a rigid and
often unreliable way of understanding others. It may be that
inferential processing based on additional contextual or social
information present in the environment could help children with
ASD to overcome the pitfalls of an object-based intention guessing
mechanism. However, even with this additional inferential
processing the comprehension of others could hardly reach the
reliability and, especially, the effortlessness typical of action
understanding based on one’s own motor competence. One may
also wonder whether, without motor understanding of others,
individuals could have those experiential aspects of what others are
doing that are fundamental for establishing a satisfactory social
life. This hypothesis, however, although not unlikely, requires
further empirical exploration.
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